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Educnion and Enpboyment 
In the Ehighly centralized system of the Philip-  forced to consider the effect of their behavior on
pines, local funding provides the only source of  the people who live and work in the local
flexibility to meet specific and urgent needs.  community.
The government in Manila, which pays all  The policy implications of these findings for
teacher salaries, finds it easier politicaUy in  the Philippines are important. They strongly
times of fiscal belt-tightening to cut recurrent  suggest that decentralization will increase
costs.  Although local funds are relatively small  efficiency. Without an increase in local funding,
percentage of the education budget, they make  the quality of primary education will suffer.
an important contribution to covering mainte-  Other developing nations, facing similar situ-
nance and operating costs.  For example, the  ations, might also consider more community
quality of both textbooks and school buildings  funding for school systems.
appears to irncrease  with the level of local
funding.  This paper is a product of the Education and
Employment Division, Population and Human
The total cost of education per student also  Resources Department  Copies are available
appears to lower in schools with greater local fi-  free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW,
nancing, regardless of the perceived quality of  Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Teresa
the school.  Administrators and teachers have  Hawkins, room S6-224, extension 33678.
greater incentive to be cost-effective when
The PPR  Working  Paper  Series  disseminawes  the findngs of work  under  way in the  Bank's  Policy,  Planing, and Research
Complex.  An objective  of the series  is to get these  fmdings  out quickly,  even  if presentations  are less than fully  polished.
The findings,  intepretations,  and conclusions  in these  papers  do not necessarily  represent  official  policy  of the Bank.
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In  many developing  countries,  the  central  government  provides  the
bulk  of financing  for  public  education.  Given  tightening  budgetary
restraints  on the  central  government's  purse,  alternative  sources  of
financing  have  to  be considered.  One  option  is  to rely,  to a greater
extent,  on support  from  individual  users  or through  contributions  from  the
local  community  (World  Bank 1986). This  policy  would  presumably  enhance
what has  been called  'external  efficiency"  in the  education  economics
literatiwre,  because it  would raise additional resources for education.
The  addition  of locally  mobilized  resources  would  also  affect
allocation  within  the  school  system. In a  highly  centralized  system,  money
from  local  sources  that  are  under  the  control  of the  school  often  provide
its  only  source  of funding  specific  needs,  particularly  those  non-salary
items  affected  by acts  in  national  appropriations.  Furthermore,  schools
that  are  financially  accountable  to the  communities  they  serve  may  be  more
responsive  to  their  clients  -- i.e.,  the  students  and  their  parents. In
order  to survive,  schools  whose  existence  depends  on local  funding  would
provide  the  type and  quality  of  schooling  the  community  desires. In
addition,  administrators  and  teachers  would  have  a greater  incentive  to be
cost-effective,  since  they  must consider  the  effect  of their  behavior  on the
financial  contributions  of people  who live  and  work In  the  immediate
vicinity  of the  school.
Although  these  arguments  are  theoretically  compelling,  there  has
been  relatively  little  empirical  research  on these  issues  in developing,  or
-2-even,  as far  as  we can  tell,  developed  countries.  Are  public  schools  that
rely  on local  resources  for  a greater  share  of their  financing  more cost
effective? In  policy  terms,  would  financial  decentralization  lead  to  more
erficient  schools?
This  paper  attempts  to answer  these  questions  using  cost,  finan-
cial  sources  and  student  achievement  data  from  Philippine  primary  schools.
The first  section,  which  follows  immediately  below,  describes  the  Philippine
setting  and  how  a school's  degree  of financial  decentralization  can  affect
efficiency.  The  degree  of decentralization  is  measured  by the  proportion  of
a school's  total  expenditures  financed  by local  contributions,  such  as
contributions  from  the  local  school  board,  municipal  government,
parent-teachers  associations  (PTA)  and  other  sources. The  s--,  ;  section
describes  the  sample  and  basic  characteristics  of the  differe..  pea  of
schools. The  third  section  presents  the  results  of estimated  cost  functions
which  determine  whether  this  proportion  is  correlated  with  school
expenditures,  holding  constant  for  student  size  and  school  quality.  A brief
concluding  section  then  follows.
CONCEPTUAL  AND EMPIRICAL  SETTING
The  Philippine  public  elementary  school  system,  which  accounts  for
95 percent  of enrollment  at that  level,  is  highly  centralized  with  several
layers  of bureaucracy.  Administratively,  schools  are  organized  into
districts,  which  are  in  turn  grouped  into  divisions  and  then  regions.
Schools  are  headed  by principals  who are  directly  supervised  by district
supervisors.  And  the  division  superintendent  in  turn  oversees  the  district
supervisors.  Almost  all  of the  important  administrative  issues  are  decided
- 3 -at  the regional  and  the  Department  of  Education,  Culture  and  Sports  (DECS)
central  office  --  e.g.  appointments,  determination  of salary  scales,  and
promotions.  Administrative  matters,  however,  are  initiated  at the
sub-regional  level,  such  as request  for  teachers  by principals,  processing
of  teacher  applications  and  drawing  up of recomme"ndations  for  promotions  of
supervisors,  principals,  teachers  and  support  staff.
The  bulk  of financial  support  of the  public  elementary  education,
which is  provided  free  and  accounts  for  70  percent  of the  DECS  budget,  comes
from  natio.al  appropriations.  The  systems  of  budgeting,  resource  allocation
and  procurement  are  highly  centralized.  The  responsibilities  for  budget
control  and  execution  are  limited  to the  upper  administrative  levels  and
stop  at the  division  office. All administrative  levels,  however,  go  through
the  motion  of budget  planning. To illustrate  the  extent  of centralization,
it is interesting  to note  that it  is at  the  regional  or division  office
where  actual  procurement  of  the  maintenance  and  operating  expense  items  of
the  schools  are  undertaken.  Schools  receive  those  items  in  kind.
Consequently,  they  have  very little  flexibility.  The  degree  of
centralization  is similar  for  personnel  services  and  capital  outlay.
The  availability  of local  funds,  though  small  compared  to the
financial  support  from  the  national  government,  provides  the  only  source  of
flexibility  and  opportunity  at lower  administrative  levels  for  matching
resources  and  urgent  school  needs. The  main  source  of local  funds  is  the
Special  Education  Fund (SEF)  created  under  Republic  Act  No.  5447. The  SEF
is  financed  from  its  share  of the  additional  tax  on real  property  collected
by the  municipality  or city  and  a  certain  portion  of taxes  on a certain  type
of cigarettes  and  duties  on imported  tobacco.
The  SEF share  of the  revenues  from  the  additional  real  property
tax  collected  by the  municipality  is  distributed  as follows:  50  percent  to
- 4 -be retained  by the  municipality,  20  percent  goes  to the  provincial  treasurer
and  the rest  is  remitted  to the  national  treasurer  to finance  expenditures
exclusively  for  stabilizing  the  SEP  in  the  municipalities,  cities  and
provinces. In  the  case  of cities,  60 percent  are  retained  and  the rest  are
transmitted  to the  national  treasurer.
Local  school  boards  for  every  city,  municipality  and  province  were
created  to administer  the  SEF  under  RA 5447  and  decide  on its  utilization.
They  are  constituted  to represent  the  school  administration,  the  local
government  and  the  parents. The  municipal  (city)  board  is  headed  by the
district  supervisor  (city  superintendent)  and  includes  as  members  the  meyor,
a representative  of the  municipal  (city),  and  the  president  or the
duly-elected  representative  of the  League  of Parent-Teachers  Associations.
It appears  then  that  RA 5447  provides  the  mechanism  whereby
schools  can  get  additional  funds  and  the  ability  to respond  with some
flexibility  and-timeliness  to emerging  specific  local  needs  and  problems.
It also  creates  a greater  sense  of accountability  among  school
administrators  and  sensitivity  to  parental  concerns.
Another  source  of funds  for  schools  is  the  local  government
appropriation  fund,  which  consists  of all  the  revenues  of the  municipal  or
city  government  from  taxes  and  other  income  generating  sources  available  for
its  own  use.  In  this  regard  the  superintendent  must  submit  requests  for
funding  to the  mayor. Grants  from  this  fund  require  the  mayor  to  monitor
its  receipt  and  use.  Finally,  there  are  funds  from  the  Parents-Teachers
Association  (PTA)  and  other  private  contributions.  These  include  donations
and  revenues  from  income  generating  activities  sponsored  by the  PTA.
Parents  have  the  lead  role  in  the  PTA  and  the  only  ones qualified  to  become
its  officers. Parents,  however,  generally  elicit  suggestons  from  the
teachers  and  principals. It is  interesting  to note  that  the  PTA  treasurer
- 5 -and  th-  principal  maintain  a  joint  bank  account  in  their  names  rather  than
the  school's. The  motivation  of this  arrangement  is  to avoid  bureaucratic
red  tape.
The  magnitudes  from  all  of these  sources  together  are  far  from
trivial. According  tc.  the  gov  r  ent's  1983  Household  and  Matching  Survey
(HSMS),  two-thirds  of  public  pri sry  schools  had  some  sort  of
extra-budgetary  funding  from  local  sources.  Some 19  percent  of schools
relied  on local  contributions  for  5-25  percent  of their  expenditure.
Another  7  percent  of them  had  local  funding  amounting  to  more than  25
percent  of their  budget. The  critical  question  is  whether  this  source  of
funding  can  affect  school  efficiency.
Local  funding  and  school  efficiency:
One reason  why  the  ability  of local  school  authorities  to  self-
finance  can  improve  school  efficiency  is that  it  can  lead  to a  more appro-
priate  input-mix  --  i.e.,  one  consistent  with  the  relative  economic  costs  of
labor  and  non-labor  inputs. Since  teachers  are  paid  directly  by the  central
education  department  and  are  assigned  to schools,  schools  which  have  no
other  funding  sources  are  consigned  to live  with the  input-mixes  mandated  by
the  central  government.  In  recent  years,  the  pressures  on the  public  budget
have  forced  the  central  authorities  to change  this  mix.  For  political  rea-
sons,  it is  simply  easier  to  make real  cuts  in  the  non-salaried  rather  than
the  salaried  budget.  (This  "recurrent  cost'  problem,  while  endemic  to all
sectors,  is  particularly  acute  in  education,  6  sector  in  which  a larger
share  of the  budget  pays  for  personnel  costs  --  see  Heller,  1979.)  Locally
generated  funds,  while  relatively  small  compared  to all  school  expenditures,
can  make an important  contribution  to  maintenance  and  non-teacher  opera-
tional  expenditures.  Across  all  public  schools  (whether  they receive  local
- 6 -contributions  or  not),  the  average  amount  of local  contributions  is  enough
to  cover  5% of all  education  expenditures  --  but  over  40%  of average  non-
personnel  expenditures.  These  figures  imply  that  local  financing  can
improve  efficiency  by a  more appropriate  balance  between  personnel  and  non-
personnel  recurrent  costs.
A second  reason  why decentralized  funding  can  improve  managerial
efficiency  is  through  the implicit  incentive  structure. As stated  in an
earlier  document:
In  a centralized  system,  administrators,  students  and  par-
ents  play  only  a  marginal  role  in determining  --indirectly
through  t,heir  choice  of schools  --  how  school  resources  are
to  be allocated.  Typically,  school  administrators  are
accountable  not  to parents  and  students  but  to central
authorities,  such  as  ministries  of education. Since  the
costs  of  monitoring,  inspecting  and  enforcing  detailed
guidelines  for  individual  schools  are  likely  to  be high,
these  ministries  set  norms,  such  as for  the  distributions
of budgetary  allocations  between  teachers'  salaries  and
other  inputs. If  norms  do  not  match  the  school's  needs  or
the  community's  preferences,  as is  often  the  case,  school
administrators  have  neither  the  financial  power  nor  the
incentive  to change  them. As a result,  the  use  of school
resources  is  inefficient.(World  Bank,  1986,  p. 11)
In  the  Philippines,  the  local  contribution  to the  financing  of
centralized  public  schools  is  done  through  formal  as  well as informal  asso-
ciations. About  601  of all  public  schools  receive  some  funds  from  PTA  or
other  sources. However,  the  average  amount  received  from  these  sources  is
relatively  small  (about  5,000  pesos  per  annum,  per  school  or 101  of average
expenditures  on  maintenance  and  operating  expenses).  Although  a  smaller
percentage  of schools  receives  aid  from  local  governments  or school  boards,
the  average  contributions  from  these  sources  is large  --  an average  of about
25,000  pesos  per annum,  the  equivalent  of about  one-half  of average
expenditures  on  maintenance  and  operating  expenses.
The goal  of this  paper  is  to determine  whether  these  reasons,
which  are  plausible  in  the  Philippine  case,  can  lead  to increased  efficiency
- 7 -in  primary  schools. We do so  by estimating  cost  functions  for  schools.
This  methodology  enables  us to  hold  constant  for  other  factors  which  could
significantly  affect  school  costa,  such  as enrollment  and  input  prices.  ln
addition,  we assume  a  multi-product  framework  to enable  us to  hold  constant
for  the  other  dimension  of school  output  --  quality,  as  measured  by average
achievement  scores. We use  a rich  data  set  which  contains  both  cost  and
school  quality  data  from  a  nationwide  sample  of Philippine  primary  schools.
These  data,  as  well as  the  exact  specificationi  of the  cost  functions  are
described  more fully  in  the  next  sections.
DATA  AND  SOME  SIMPLE COMPARISONS
The  sample  schools  in  our  analysis  were  obtained  from  the  ongoing
Household  School  Matching  Survey  Project  (HSMS),  conducted  by the  EDPITAF
team  of the  then  Ministry  of Education.  The  data  for  these  schools  were
obtained  from  a stratified  natLonal  sample  of barangays  (villages).  These
data  are  part  of a  broader  eftort  to collect  integrated  baseline  information
for  policy  analysis  and  the !mpact  evaluation  of the  Program  for  Decentral-
ized  Education  and  Development  (PRODED).  Aside  from  school  level  data,  the
HSMS  data  base includes  infomnation  at the  level  the  of community,  household
and  individuals.
The  HSMS  data  were  collected  nationwide  between  May 1982  and
December  1983,  from  260  barangays  and  4990  households.  These  were  chosen  on
the  basis  of a  two-stage  stratified  random  sampling  scheme. The
identification  of the  barangay  samples  involved  the  selection  of 20
barangays  in  each region  acrose  urban  and  rural  and  affected  and  unaffected
strata. ('Affected"  samles are  those  belonging  to school  districts  found
-8-by PRODED  to  be below  the  national  cut-off  in  these  indicators:  achievement
scores,  school  part  cipation  rate  and  survival  rate). rhe  villages  were
randomly  drawn  with  probability  proportional  to  size,  defined  as  the  number
of households  in  the  barangay. Equal  allocation  was used,  i.e.,  five
barangays  were  drawn  across  each  stratum  in every  region.
From  the  sample  barangays  wero drawn  the  sample  households.  The
sampling  frame  was a listing  of all  households  in  the  sample  communities
with at least  one  member  less  than  25  years  old.  From  the  listing  of
members  in each  sample  household  was  made a group  of elementary  school
childre and  their  schools  were identified.  Data  on those  schools  w(--
collectv4  including  (among  others)  information  on finance,  costs,  inputs  and
other  schcol  characteristi  s.  A  random  sample  of 20 grade  four  pupils  were
given  school  achievement  tests. Their  average  score,  which  can  be used  as  a
summary  indicator  of school  quality,  was computed  for  each  of the  586
sample  elementary  schools.
Descriptive  Statistics
Table  1  below  shows  the  mean characteristics  of the  three
categories  of schools,  by degree  of financial  independence  from  national
appropriations,  as  measured  by the  proportion  of school  expenditures  from
local  sources. Schools  that  are  financially  less  dependent  on  DECS appear
to  have an  advantage  over  the  more dependent  schools  in  terms  of performance
in  achievement  scores.  The  former  also  tend  to  be  situated  in  communities
that  are  more  urbanized  and  character  'ed  by  higher  wages.
WJth respect  to  achievement  test  performance,  the  rank  order  of
schools  is  completely  in  the  same  order  as  their  degree  of
relative  financial  independence.  This  is  true  for  all  the  subject  areas
- 9  -Table  lt  School  Characteristics  by Degree  of  Local  Financing
Proportion  of
Expenditures  From  Local  Contribution
School  Characteristic  LT 5 2  5-25  2  GT 25  2
Achievement  score:
Overall  42.26  47.60  48.25
Math  39.68  45.00  44.10
English  40.93  45.29  46.13
Pilipino  46.19  52.52  54.51
Student  inputst
School  size  721.57  1214.81  821.34
Avg.  mental  ability  (MAT)  42.56  46.76  46.48
Wage of Unskld  adult  13.39  15.07  17.10
(background  measure)
Rural  school  0.54  0.36  0.28
Affected  Barangay  0.51  0.44  0.52
Labor  inputs:
N of teachers  24.62  38.74  27.76
X  of teacher  with  MS  0.47  0.34  0.38
Teaching  experience  15.56  16.30  13.52
Training  0.54  0.52  0.64
Supervisor  visits  4.53  6.67  5.65
Principal  experience  5.32  6.85  10.80
Non-labor  inputs:
Desk  per  classroom  14.46  18.62  16.60
Students  per  class  36.15  36.56  35.19
Textbook  per  student  3.46  3.66  4.67
Floor  area  1334.60  1547.17  1125.64
Quality  of floor  58.84  62.96  64.97
N of teach.  manuals  69.83  92.72  95.88
workbooks  38.62  32.94  26.92
Other  (process)  inputs:
PTA  meetings  5.27  5.02  5.40
Cost  per  student:
Personnel  469.37  294.18  226.37
Maint.  and  oper.  41.80  21.27  34.91
Maint.  and  oper.  less
textbooks  34.96  16.47  29.89
Total  less  text  459.48  287.12  255.07
Total  675.42  318.67  265.46
Number  of schools  254*  66  25
Proportion  of schools  0.74  0.19  0.07
*143  of these  schools  (or  562)  have  F of less  than 1%.
- 10  -except  in  math  where  tne  average  score  of schools  with the  local  share  of
funding  at  5-251  rank*d  slightly  higher  than  thoso  schools  with a share
greater  than 251,  though  the  average  score  in  the  moet  DECS  dependent
schools  (less  than  51  share)  remained  the  lowest. The  same  pattern  of
.- elationship  with  degree  of financial  decentralization  was  observed  for
their  mental  ability  test (MAT)  scores.
Average  recurrent  cost  rer student,  on the  other  hand,  increases
with degree  of dependence  on national  appropriations.  The  unit  recurrent
cost  is  675  pesos  for  schools  with less  than  5 percent  of its  expenditures
accounted  for  by  local  sources  compared  to  2;5  pesos  for  schools  whose  local
share  is  25  percent  or  more.  Personnel  cost  per  student  follows  a  similar
pattern.  In  contrast,  there  does  not  seem  to be a  monotonic  relationship
between  maintenance  and  operating  expenditure  per  student  and  degroe  of
reliance  on local  funds.
In  terms  of the  quality  of labor  used,  it is interesting  that
while  schools  with relatively  more local  funding  tend  to  have less
experienced  teachers,  they  have  in contrast  more  experienced  principals.  On
the  other  hand,  the  relationship  is  not  clear  for  tx-aining,  supervisor
visits,  and  percentage  of  teachers  with  griduate  level  courses.
Regarding  non-labor  inputs,  textbook  per  student  and  quality  of
school  buildings  (as  measured  by the  percentage  of the  floor  area  in  good
condition)  appear  to be increasing  with degree  of local  finance. But,  there
is no  clear  monotonic  relationship  between  local  finance  and  desks  per
classroom,  class  sizo,  floor  area  per  student,  teaching  manual  per  teachers
and  workbooks  per  student.
- 11  -Finally,  the  simple  cross  tabulations  do  not  indicate  that
frequency  of  PTA  meetings,  a  measure  of parental  involvement,  is correlated
with  the  extent  to  which  schools  are  funded  by local  sources.
EMPIRICAL  RESULTS
The  empirical  portion  of  this  paper  seeks  to  address  two
questions:  whether  schools  that  rely  less  on  central  funding  sources  are
more  efficient;  and,  if so,  why.
Are  schools  with  proportionatelv  more local  funding  more  efficient?
To answer  this  question,  we compare  the  cost  of schools  that  have
more local  funds  relative  to their  budget  with  those  that  have  less.
However,  a simple  comparison  of average  expenditure  is  not  enough. Other
factors,  such  as school  size  and  the  relative  cost  of  attracting  labor  to
the  school,  must be  held  constant. To do so,  we use  cost  function  analysis
(see  Fox 1980).
A school's  short-run  total  cost  is  a function  of outputs,  input
prices  and  its  fixed  capital  stock. Economic  theory  suggests  that  the
choice  of functlinal  form  of this  function  is  arbitrary  (i.e.,  any  positive,
homogeneous,  non-decreasing,  concave  function  of factor  prices  is a cost
function). In  this  exploratory  study,  we estimate  the  simple  double-log  (or
Cobb-Douglas)  form. 1
'To  test  the  robustness  of  our results,  we also  estimated  other  forms,
such  as  the  linear  and  quadratic. Since  our  results  were insensitive  to
these  specifications,  we do  not  present  the  results. Of course,  all  of
the  above  specifications  impose  prior  parametric  restrictions  on the  pro-
duction  process. For  example,  the  Cobb-Douglas  assumes  a  unit  elasticity
of substitution  between  any  two factors. In subsequent  versions  of the
paper,  we may  use  more general  specifications  (see  Jimenez  1986).
- 12 -We use  two  basic  cost  function  models. In  the  first,  we assume
the  traditional  one-output  (enrolment)  model. For  the ith  school,  short-run
cost  (C)  is determined  by:  student  enrolment  (S),  a  proxy  variable  for  labor
cost  confronted  by the  school  (W  - the  daily  wage rate  of unskilled  adult
workers  in  the  community  where  the  school  is located),  and,  as our
innovative  component  to  measure  x-efficiency  within  schools,  the  proportion
of current  school  expenditure  from  local  sources  (F). Thus,  for  the  ith
school,  the  cost  function  is as  follows:
(1)  ln Ci - a +  b ln Si +  c ln Wj +  d Fi +  U$
where  ln  signifies  natural  logarithm;  a,  b, c and  d  are  parameters  to be
estimated  and  u is a randomly  distributed  error  term. We note  that  the
proxy  variable  to control  for  differences  in  factor  prices  is  an imperfect
one. For  example,  it could  also  be an indicator  of the  average  socioeco-
nomic  status  of the  population  from  which  the  school  is  drawing  its  stu-
dents. We nevertheless  include  it in  this  exploratory  paper. In subsequent
studies,  we hope  to get  a  better  measure,  such  as average  wages  of teachers
by region.
The  estimated  regression  equation,  using  OLS,  is  presented  as
equation  (1)  of Table  2.  The  principal  variable  with  which  we are  concerned
is  the  correlation  of the  financial  dependency  variable  with school  expendi-
ture.  Its  coefficient  (d)  is  negative  and  significant.  This  implies  that
per  student  cost  is lower  among  schools  that  are  more dependent  on local
finance.
This finding,  ho%.'ever,  does  not  yet  show  that  they  are  more
efficient. The issue  may  be raised  that  lower  per  student  cost  may  have
been  achieved  at  the  expense  of school  quality.  Consequently,  we estimate  a
- 13 -Table  2:  Cost  Functions
Total  Current  School  Personnel  Maintenance  and
Expenditure  Expenditure  Operating  Expenditure
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
PROPLOC  -1.61  -1.66  -2.400  -1.454
(F)  (  6.27)  (  6.27)  (  7.35)  (  2.97)
Ln STUDENT  SIZE  .76  .740  .745  .355
(S)  (15.84)  (12.87)  (10.36)  (  3.30)
Ln SCHOOL  QUALITY  .196  -.366  .697
(Q)  (  .71)  (1.10)  (1.40)
RURAL  -. 046  -. 299  -.504
(R)  (  .34)  (1.96)  (2.20)
AFFECTED  -.044  -. 0004  -.329
(A)  (  .42)  (-.00)  (1.72)
Ln  WAGE  .127  .105  .162  -. 346
(W)  1.11)  (  .90)  (1.20)  (1.72)
CONSTANT  7.19  6.67  8.592  5.566
(19.40)  (6.01)  (6.77)  (2.92)
R2 .576  .573  .418  .137
N  226  226  338  338
second  basic  cost  function  model  in  which  the  simple  regression
specification  was expanded  to include  school  quality  and  other  control
variables. Specifically,  the  following  equation  was  estimated:
(1)  ln  Ci - a +  b ln  Si  + c ln  Wi + d Fi
+  g  Ri +  k  Ai +  m ln  Qi +  ui
where  Q - school  quality;  R - 1 if  rural,  0 otherwise;  A - 1  if
the  school  is in an "affected'  or disadvantaged  area,  as defined  by PRODED,
- 14 -O  otherwisel  g, k, and  m are  parameters  to  be estimated. School  quality  is
measured  as  the average  achievement  score  of grade  4 pupils  who  were  tested
by HSMS in  mathematics,  English,and  Pilipino.  These  are  the  groups  of 20
grade  4 students  that  HSMS  randomly  selected  from  each  of the  sample  schools
and  were  given  curriculum  based  achievement  tests.  The  dummy  variables  R and
A were included  to further  control  for  local  differences.
The  estimates  for  this  expanded  specification,  which  are  presented
in column  2,  Table  2,  confirm  our  earlier  finding  of a  significant  negative
correlation  between  school  expenditure  and  dependence  on local  finance.  It
is intert  .. ing  that  the  coefficient  of F and  its  t statistic  hardly  changed,
suggesting  that  the  correlation  between  cost  and  degree  of local  finance  is
robust.
Why are  schools  with relatively  more local  financing  more efficient?
The  regression  estimates  also  reveal  that,  while  student  size
clearly  determines  school  expenditure,  the  coefficient  of school  quality  is
not  statistically  significant.  We conjecture  that  most  public  schools  are
not  getting  the  most  out  of their  budget  in  terms  of student  learning  and/or
the  number  of students  being  taught.
If  current  expenditure  per  student  is lower  for  schools  that  are
more  dependent  on local  finance,  holding  school  quality  constant,  where  are
the  cost  savings  coming  from?  To  examine  this  issue,  an  expenditure  function
similar  to  equation  (2)  above  was  estimated  separately  for  personnel  cost
and  maintenance  and  operation  expenditure  (MOE).
In  both  the  MOE and  the  personnel  cost  funtions  (columns  3  and  4
of  Table  2)  the  coefficient  of  F  is  negative  and  significant.  It  is
interesting  that  the  absolute  value  the  coefficient  is larger  for  MOE  than
for  personnel  expenditure.  This  implies  that  on a  percentage  basis  an
- 15 -increase  in  the  relative  Importance  of local  finance  in school  budgets  tends
to  be associated  with greater  cost  savings  in  personnel  expenditure  than  in
MOE.
If indeed  schools  in  the  Philippines  are  inside  the  production
possibility  frontier,  why is  expenditure  systematically  correlated  with
number  of student  but  not  with  school  quality?  We conjecture  that  the
explanation  lies  probably  in  the  prevailing  structure  of incentives.
Budgetary  allocation  is  clearly  tied  to the  number  'f  students  in school  and
not  to their  learning  achievement.  Furthermore,  performance  indicator  for
student  size is  trore  transparent  than  learning.  Consequently,  it  may  be
expected  that  a  budget  maximizing  bureacrat  a la  Niskanen  i1971)  would  tend
to accommodate  enrolments  first  and  keep  expenditure  per  student in  the
neighborhood  of the  standard  allocation  formula  normally  used.  Furthermmore,
in the  absence  of a similar  motive  force  for  a  cost-effective  pursuit  of
school  quality,  there  may  be a tendency  to treat  as 'residual  variables'
student  learning  achievement  and  the  cost  of improving  it.  In  the  context
of this  environment  it is,  therefore,  not  unreasonable  to expect  these
variables  to  be largely  determined  by the idiosyncracies  of individual
teachers  and  school  officials. Hence,  school  quality  and  cost  tend  to  be
uncorrelated.
CONCLUSIONS
The  main  purpose  of  this'  paper  was to test  the  hypothesis  that  the
source  of funding  matters  in  determining  cost  of schools. Our  conclusion,
based  on this  preliminary  evidence,  is  that  schools  which  rely  more  heavily
on local  sources  are  more  efficient  --  i.e., have lower  cost,  holding  con-
- 16  -stant  for  enrolment  and  quality. Decentralized  schools  appear  to save  on
personnel  costs. Since  teachers  are  assigned  centrally,  most of  these  sav-
ings  are likely  due  to fewer  non-teaching  personnel  or in lower  salaries.
As far  as  we know (and  we would  be grateful  if readers  can  point
out  other  references  which  we have  not  uncovered)  this  evidence  is  the  first
empirical  indication  in the  literature  that  local  finance  can lead  to
improved  cost  performance,  given  size  and  quality. Because  this  finding  is
so new,  other  studies  need  to be  undertaken  to  test  its  robustness.  How-
ever,  if found  consistent,  the  policy  implications  are  very important  for
the  Phi  ippines.
Since  the  early  1980's  the  Philippine  government  has  been  address-
ing  financing-related  problems  at  the  primary  level. In 1981  it  launched
the  Program  for  Decentralized  Educational  Development  (PRODED),  which  seeks,
among  others  to improve  policies  in financing  and  administration.  Pre-
viously,  the regional  education  budgets  had  been  appropriated  using  a  stan-
dard  formula  based  on enrollment  expansion  but  totally  ignoring  the  perfor-
mance  of the  regions  in  terms  of qualitative  criteria  as student  achieve-
ment,  participation  rate  and  cohort  survival  rates. Recently,  a new  finan-
cing  policy  has  been  introduced  which  is  supposed  to take  both  quantitative
and  qualitative  factors  into  account. Furthermore,  the  national  government
has  decided  to finance  the  salaries  of all  public  school  teacher,  a  move
that  could  weaken  local  accountability.
The  financing  problem  is further  complicated  by the  new  constitu-
tional  mandate  to  establish  free  public  secondary  education.  Unless  new
sourc;es  of funds  are  tapped  and/or  internal  efficiency  in  education
improved,  the  quality  cf  public  elementary  education  could  suffer. A pos-
sible  restructuring  of the  DECS  budget  could  occur  favoring  more  allocations
to secondary  education  at  the  expense  of primary  education.  Consequently,
- 17 -there  is a need  for  the  government  to explore  efficient  and  equitable  sup-
plementary  financing  arrangements.  One  possible  area  is  to tap  local  commu-
nities  and  households  whose  potential  contributions  have  been limited  by the
current  financing  arrangements,  an observation  which  is  common  in  many
developing  countries  (World  Bank  1986).
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